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Climate Disruption in Canadian Constitutional Law: References re Greenhouse Gas Pollution
Pricing Act
Jocelyn Stacey*
Abstract
This analysis considers the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in References re Greenhouse Gas
Pollution Pricing Act, 2021 SCC 11, in which a majority of the Court upheld as constitutional
national carbon pricing legislation. The decision presents an excellent illustration of the legallydisruptive nature of climate change. Illustrating that nothing is static in a climate disrupted
world—including constitutional law—this article identifies three shifts the Court makes in
relation to climate disruption. First, the decision represents a shift away from climate denialism
toward a judicial willingness to confront the environmental, social and legal implications of
climate change for Canada. Second, the majority embraces and perhaps strengthens a “culture
of justification” in climate decision-making. Third—and more tentatively—the majority moves
beyond the erasure of Indigenous peoples from Canadian federalism but still yet fails to engage
with Indigenous laws and jurisdiction as part of Canada’s constitutional response to climate
change.
1. Introduction
The federalism challenge of regulating greenhouse gas emissions in Canada has long been a
subject of academic scrutiny.1 While carbon pricing, as a regulatory tool for emissions reduction
has enjoyed considerable support in policy circles, Canada’s constitutional law and politics has
complicated the journey to a national carbon pricing plan. The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC)
put to rest decades of academic speculation in its March 2021 decision which upheld as
constitutional the federal Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act (GGPPA).2
In contrast to much high-profile climate litigation, the GGPPA Reference3 is not a response to
institutional failure nor is it part of the ‘rights turn’.4 It is rather an example of how a high Court
*

Associate Professor, Peter A. Allard School of Law at the University of British Columbia. Many thanks to Eric M.
Adams for helpful feedback on an early draft. My analysis has benefited from conversations through the Centre for
Constitutional Studies and with the Oxford environmental law community. Thank you to Tristan Packwood Greaves
(Allard JD 2021) for his excellent research assistance. All errors are my own.
1
Nathalie J. Chalifour, ‘Canadian Climate Federalism: Parliament’s Ample Constitutional Authority to Legislate GHG
Emissions through Regulations, a National Cap and Trade Program, or a National Carbon Tax’ (2016) 36 NJCL 331;
Shi-Ling Hsu & Robin Elliot, ‘Regulating Greenhouse Gases in Canada: Constitutional and Policy Dimensions’ (2009)
54:3 McGill LJ 463; Peter W. Hogg, ‘Constitutional Authority over Greenhouse Gas Emissions’ (2009) 46 Alberta
Law Review 507 [Hogg].
2
Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, SC 2018, c 12, s 186 [GGPPA].
3
References re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2021 SCC 11 [GGPPA Reference].
4
Joana Setzer & Lisa C. Vanhala, ‘Climate change litigation: A review of research on courts and litigants in climate
governance’ (2019) 10 WIREs Climate Change, e580 and Jacqueline Peel & Hari M. Osofosky, ‘A Rights Turn in
Climate Litigation?’ (2018) 7:1 Transnational Environmental Law 37.
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has been thrust into the difficult task of adjudicating on climate change as a result of legislative
action on carbon pricing. Thus, the GGPPA Reference presents rich case study for understanding
the “legally disruptive nature of climate change.”5 That is, the decision allows us to see how
“existing legal doctrines and frameworks are forced to confront, respond, and perhaps even
evolve to respond to climate change, beyond the application and incremental development of
existing rules and doctrines.”6 In this decision, the SCC is forced to confront and characterize
climate change and Parliament’s creative legislative response to it. Doing so provokes the Court
to revisit fundamental principles of Canadian constitutionalism in articulating, refining and
applying the relevant legal tests.
In this analysis, I set out the factual and legal backdrop to the SCC’s decision in References re
Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act (GGPPA Reference), I distill the main themes of the Court’s
lengthy decision and I highlight three notable shifts the Court makes in this decision. First, I argue
that this decision represents a shift away from climate denialism toward a judicial willingness to
confront the environmental, social and legal implications of climate change for Canada. We will
see that this shift is so strong that it may anticipate a form of ‘climate exceptionalism’ with
implications for future environmental litigation. The second shift is away from treating climate
claims as ‘not justiciable’ to embrace and perhaps strengthen a ‘culture of justification’ in climate
decision-making. The third shift is a more tentative one, moving beyond the erasure of
Indigenous peoples from Canadian federalism but still yet failing to engage with Indigenous laws
and jurisdiction as part of Canada’s constitutional response to climate change. The GGPPA
Reference is a momentous decision for climate law and policy in Canada, for Canadian federalism,
and for appreciating the challenges of adjudicating on climate change.
2. The Constitutional and Political Context of Emissions Regulation in Canada
2.1 The Canadian Constitutional Landscape
Federalism is an influential force in Canadian environmental law and policy because of the
perceived ambiguity over the scope of constitutional powers that Parliament and the Legislatures
have to regulate the environment. The Constitution Act, 1867 divides powers between federal
Parliament (under section 91) and the provincial legislatures (under section 92). None of “the
environment”, “pollution” or “climate change” are matters listed under either section.
While the powers enumerated in the Constitution Act may seem to skew in favour of the
provinces on matters related to pollution and environmental protection, Canadian constitutional
law consistently affirms that Parliament has a meaningfully role to play in environmental
protection. Indeed, a series of important SCC decisions in the late 1980s and 1990s solidified this
federal role by upholding federal ocean dumping legislation, federal toxics regulation, and federal
environmental impact assessment legislation.7 Since that time, constitutional jurisprudence has
5

Elizabeth Fisher, Eloise Scotford and Emily Barritt, ’The Legally Disruptive Nature of Climate Change’ (2017) 80
The Modern Law Review 173.
6
Fisher, Scotford and Barritt, supra note 5 at 174.
7
R v Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd [1988] 1 SCR 401 (SCC) [Zellerbach]; R v Hydro-Québec [1997] 3 SCR 213 (SCC);
Friends of the Oldman River Society v Canada (Minister of Transport) [1992] 1 SCR 3 (SCC) [Oldman].
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evolved toward an understanding of “cooperative federalism”, which tolerates considerable
overlapping spheres of jurisdiction up to the point of direct conflict.8 Still Parliament has not
taken an especially assertive role in environmental legislation, adopting narrow definitions of its
jurisdiction and preferring in many cases to seek informal cooperative mechanisms rather than
binding legislation.
There is broad consensus that Parliament has the constitutional power to legislate in relation to
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.9 The only question has been how it can do so. We will see
that the complexity of the climate challenge prompted Canada to take a creative and largely
uncharted path to a national carbon pricing scheme.
2.2 Canada’s Emissions Reduction Challenge
Canada’s emissions challenge is defined by regional diversity, sectoral differences and decades
of delay in taking meaningful action on emissions reduction. Canada is known internationally as
the only country to formally withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol after years of inaction under
successive governments.10 While Canada enthusiastically participated in the negotiations of the
Paris Agreement, as of spring 2021, it is the only G7 country whose national emissions have
increased since signing the agreement.11 Despite a long pattern of setting and then missing
targets, in spring 2021 Canada increased its target to 40-45% emissions reduction target by
2030.12
Delay at the national level reflects the regional and sectoral challenges in Canada’s emissions
profile, which centre on the controversial Alberta oil sands and still growing oil and gas
production for export concentrated in Alberta and Saskatchewan.13 Emissions reduction has
happened in Canada. From 2005 to 2016, seven of thirteen jurisdictions reduced their GHG
8

The “double aspect doctrine” recognizes that the provinces and Parliament may both legislate with respect to the
same factual scenario (e.g. highways) each in their own constitutionally-valid way. The applicability of the double
aspect doctrine was a key issue in the GGPPA Reference.
9
This was agreed upon by all parties in the GGPPA Reference. In 2016 the Federal Court of Appeal upheld fuel
standards regulations issued under the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, relying on the Criminal Law power
(Syncrude Canada Ltd v Canada (Attorney General) 2016 FCA 160). Nathalie Chalifour 2016 National Journal on
Constitutional Law; [Hogg] supra note 1.
10
Staff and Agencies, ‘Canada pulls out of Kyoto Protocol’ (13 December 2011)
<https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/dec/13/canada-pulls-out-kyoto-protocol> accessed 19 May
2021. By the time of its withdrawal, Canada’s national emissions are reported to have risen by approximately 33%
compared to 1990 levels far from its Kyoto commitment of 6% reductions.
11
Ian Austen and Christopher Flavelle, ‘Trudeau was a global climate hero, now Canada risks falling behind’ The
New York Times (New York, 21 April 2021) <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/21/world/canada/trudeauclimate-oil-sands.html> accessed 19 May 2021.
12
Christian Noel, Louis Blouin, and Laurence Martin ‘Canada's new climate change target will exceed 40% cut in
emissions: Radio-Canada sources’ (Ottawa, 21 April 2021) <https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/ghg-emissionstarget-reductions-1.5996400> accessed 19 May 2021.
13
Nia Williams, ‘Canada’s oil sands hit record high production – gov’t data’ (6 January 2021) Reuters, online: <
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-canada-crude-idUSKBN29B2N8> accessed 21 May 2021.
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emissions considerably; however, these reductions were largely offset by increases in the other
provinces and territories.14 At the same time, the regional distribution of climate impacts do
not track GHG production. The territories and coastal provinces already experience significant
climate impacts. For instance, Yukon has experienced a 2.3°C increase in average temperatures
between 1948 and 2016, while average winter temperatures have increased by 4.3°C in the
same period.15 The severity of flooding in recent years has resulted in more military personnel
deployed in natural disaster response nationally than those deployed abroad.16 The City of
Vancouver, a coastal urban centre estimates that $1 billion of flood management infrastructure
is needed by 2100 and estimates that a major flood would result in $7 billion in damage.17
Indigenous peoples, subject to systemic racism as a result of historic and ongoing colonization,
face disproportionate climate harms which disrupt the relationship between Indigenous
societies and the land.18
2.3 The Emergence of a National Pricing Scheme
It is against this backdrop of constitutional culture, prolonged inaction on implementing
international climate commitments, and the very real regional and sectoral challenges of
emissions that the federal government set to work in 2016 to devise a national pricing scheme.
After playing a prominent role in the negotiations of the Paris Agreement, Canada had the
difficult task of forging consensus amongst the provinces and territories. That consensus was, in
fact, almost achieved. Collaboration across provinces and territories, fostered by the federal
government, yielded the 2016 Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change.
The Pan-Canadian Framework detailed the backstop approach to national carbon pricing, which
would eventually become the GGPPA. The Pan-Canadian Framework was adopted by twelve of
thirteen jurisdictions, with only Saskatchewan withholding support.
Parliament proceeded with the national plan, enacting the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act
in 2018. The GGPPA has two main operative parts. Part 1 implements a fuel charge set
according to the GHG emissions intensity of listed fuels. The amount of the fuel charge
14

Environment and Climate Change, National Inventory Report 1990-2016: Greenhouse Gas Sources and Sinks in
Canada – Executive Summary, 2018 (online), at p 13; cited by the majority at [24] and [184].
15
Xuebin Zhang and others, ‘Canada’s Changing Climate Report, Chapter 4: Changes in Temperature and
Precipitation Across Canada’ (Environment and Climate Change Canada, 2019)
<https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/sites/www.nrcan.gc.ca/files/energy/Climate-change/pdf/CCCR_FULLREPORT-ENFINAL.pdf> accessed May 19 2021.
16
Government of Canada, ‘Operation LENTUS’ (12 December 2018) <https://www.canada.ca/en/departmentnational-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-lentus.html> accessed 21
May 2021; David Pugliese, ‘Canadian Military has 2,000 personnel dealing with floods but provinces determine
priorities’ (Ottawa Citizen, 30 April 2019) < https://ottawacitizen.com/news/local-news/canadian-military-has2000-personnel-dealing-with-floods-but-provinces-determine-priorities> accessed 21 May 2021.
17
Vancouver City Council, ‘Motion 2 Ramping Up Vancouver’s Climate Action in Response to the Climate
Emergency’ (16 January 2019) <https://council.vancouver.ca/20190116/documents/cfsc3.pdf> accessed 20 May
2021. The $7 billion figure does not include cost of business disruption nor clean-up and recovery.
18
See section 4.3 infra.
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increases over time. For instance, this amounts to 8.84 cents/litre imposed on gasoline in 2021,
which increases to 11.05 cents/litre in 2022.19 An important feature of the legislation is that it
requires the federal government to distribute the revenue collected from the fuel charge back
to the provinces or territories of origin.20 Part 2 of the Act addresses major emitters. It
establishes an output-based emissions scheme whereby industrial facilities must pay the
carbon price on GHG emissions that exceed sector-specific output standards. Industrial facilities
may also earn surplus emissions credits when their emissions fall below the applicable output
standards. Industrial facilities subject to Part 2 are designated by the executive in the
regulations and include, for instance, production of thermal coal, and upgrading heavy oil.21
Importantly, the GGPPA acts as a “federal backstop” for national pricing. That is, if a province or
territory already has a sufficiently stringent carbon pricing scheme in place, then Part 1 and/or
Part 2 of the GGPPA do not apply to that province. When making a determination about
whether a territory or province should be listed under the Act and therefore subject to the
backstop, the Act prescribes that: “… the Governor in Council shall take into account, as the
primary factor, the stringency of provincial pricing mechanisms for greenhouse gas
emissions.”22 If this threshold of “stringency” is met, then the GGPPA effectively lies dormant,
because the objective of a minimum, cross-country carbon price is achieved.
When the GGPPA came into force, six provinces and territories were determined by the federal
government to meet the stringency requirement for one or both Parts of the Act.23 In addition,
the governments of Yukon and Nunavut requested that the federal scheme apply. While
Alberta, Ontario and Manitoba all supported the Pan-Canadian Framework, subsequent
changes in provincial governments led these provinces to withdraw their support and oppose
the GGPPA. Alberta and Ontario repealed existing carbon pricing regimes, meaning that they
were subject to the GGPPA, along with Manitoba and Saskatchewan.24 The governments of
Saskatchewan, Ontario and later Alberta each filed reference cases before their provincial
Courts of Appeal questioning the constitutionality of the GGPPA. Majorities of the

19

GGPPA, supra note 2 Schedule 2.
GGPPA, supra note 2 s 165. Current policy is that 90% of the revenue goes to households in the form of a rebate.
21
Output-Based Pricing System Regulations SOR2019-266, Schedule 1.
22
GGPPA, supra note 2, s 166(3), 189(2). Section 166(3) for the determination on Part 1 of the Act and identical
language at Section 189(2) for the determination of Part 2.
23
Canada, ‘How we’re putting a price on carbon pollution’ (Canada, 28 June 2019)
<https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/climate-change/pricing-pollution-how-it-willwork/putting-price-on-carbon-pollution.html> accessed 20 May 2021. BC, Quebec, Nova Scotia, PEI (Part II
applies), NFLD & Lab; NWT
24
As of January 1, 2020, Alberta has a new regime for major emitters and is no longer subject to Part 2 of the
GGPPA. New Brunswick did not initially meet the stringency requirement but later brought in a fuel charge that
was determined to meet the federal minimum, though the province offset the price by lowering its excise tax:
Jacques Poitras, ‘A made-in-New Brunswick carbon tax is here, but will it actually curb consumption?’ (1 April
2020) CBC News, online: https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/new-brunswick/new-brunswick-carbon-tax-1.5516992
accessed 21 May 2021.
20
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Saskatchewan and Ontario Courts of Appeal upheld the GGPPA as constitutional.25 A majority of
the Alberta Court of Appeal found the Act to be unconstitutional.26
3. The Supreme Court Decision
One of the many notable features of this case is the fact that Canada asserted early on—and
throughout the litigation—that it had the constitutional authority to enact the GGPPA, not under
an enumerated head of federal power, but rather under the national concern branch of its
residual Peace, Order and Good Government (POGG) power.27 The POGG power is the subject of
enduring interest from constitutional scholars because of its potential for inviting significant
federal overreach that would subsume spheres of provincial authority.28 The caselaw on the
POGG power is thin, spread over many decades, and is characterized by somewhat ambiguous
legal tests and judicial attentiveness to maintaining a balance of power in the federation.
With eight sets of reasons emerging from the Courts of Appeal, and 28 sets of arguments from
parties and intervenors before the Supreme Court of Canada, the stage was set for Canada’s
highest court to rule on one of the thorniest constitutional cases in recent history.
3.1 The Majority Reasons
Writing for a majority of six judges, Chief Justice Wagner upheld the GGPPA as constitutional
under the national concern branch of POGG. In doing so, the majority also revised the national
concern test. The constitutional analysis to determine the validity of legislation consists of two
well-worn stages: first, characterizing the legislation (that is, determining its true subject matter
or what is called the “pith and substance” analysis), and second, classification of the matter under
the appropriate constitutional power. For the majority, classification was focused only on the
national concern branch of POGG, rather than other possible powers as advanced by the
interveners.
The majority held that the true subject matter of the GGPPA is “establishing minimum national
standards of GHG price stringency to reduce GHG emissions.”29 Characterizing the pith and
25

Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act 2019 ONCA 544; Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution
Pricing Act 2019 SKCA 40.
26
Reference re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act 2020 ABCA 74.
27
Section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867 begins: “It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate and House of Commons, to make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of
Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the
Legislatures of the Provinces…” Caselaw has held that this constitutional clause contains an “emergency branch” of
federal power, a “national concern” branch (the subject of this litigation) and, potentially a “gap branch”: Hogg,
supra note 1.
28
For an excellent and concise review, see Andrew Leach and Eric M. Adams, “Seeing Double: Peace, Order, and
Good Government, and the Impact of Federal Greenhouse Gas Emissions Legislation on Provincial Jurisdiction”
(2020) 29 Constitutional Forum 1.
29
GGPPA Reference, supra note 3 [56], [80].
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substance of the legislation was contentious before all courts and with a variety of possibilities
suggested by the litigants from the broad “regulating greenhouse gas emissions”30 to the specific
“minimum national pricing standards integral to Canada’s treaty commitment to reduce
nationwide GHG emissions.”31 Ultimately, it was the framing of the majority of the Saskatchewan
Court of Appeal which prevailed. The majority considered the title and preamble of the Act, the
“mischief” it is intended to address, the legislative history. Each of these features, in the
majority’s view, emphasized pricing to reduce emissions on a national scale as both the purpose
and effect of the legislation. Anticipating the dissenting reasons, the majority noted that the
inclusion of “minimum national standards” as part of the pith and substance gave “expression to
the national backstop nature of the GGPPA.”32 And it further noted that the scope of
discretionary powers delegated by the Act were constitutional and that any powers exercised
under the Act were subject to the requirements of both constitutional and administrative law.33
Turning to classification, the next analytic step, the majority considered only the national concern
doctrine. The majority clarified, refined and applied each step of the national concern test: (i) the
matter meets the threshold question of national concern; (ii) the matter is single, distinctive and
indivisible; and, (iii) the scale of impact is reconcilable with the division of powers under the
Constitution. Mindful of the concern that the national concern branch creates a new and
permanent matter of federal jurisdiction,34 it sought to alleviate some of this worry by clarifying
that the “double aspect doctrine” applies in this case allowing for overlapping federal and
provincial legislation.35
At the threshold stage, the majority observed that the critical question is whether the matter is
“of sufficient concern to Canada as a whole” and it described this as a common sense inquiry
which must be supported by evidence.36 The matter in this case (establishing minimum national
standards of GHG price stringency to reduce GHG emissions) “clearly” met this threshold
requirement, with significant evidence of the “existential threat” of climate change and the
centrality of carbon pricing to emissions reduction.37 The majority directed much of its attention
to the requirement that the matter has a “singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility” that
distinguishes it from matters of provincial concern. It reasoned that two principles of federalism
animate this requirement: the prevention of federal overreach into matters of provincial concern
and provincial inability to deal with the matter.38 Applying the refined test to this case, the
30

ibid (Factum of The Attorney General of Saskatchewan [4]). This is the pith and substance adopted by the
dissenting judges at the Saskatchewan and Ontario Courts of Appeal (Saskatchewan Reference, supra note 25
[333]); Ontario Reference, supra note 25 [213]) and by the majority of the Alberta Court of Appeal (Alberta
Reference, supra note 25 [256]).
31
In the Matter of the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, SC 2018, c 12, s 186, SCC No. 38663 (Factum of the
Smart Prosperity Institute, intervener) [21].
32
GGPPA Reference, supra note 3 [81].
33
See Part 4.2 infra.
34
GGPPA Reference, supra note 3 [90].
35
ibid [126].
36
ibid [142], [133].
37
ibid [171].
38
ibid [146].
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majority emphasized that the matter here was predominantly extra-provincial and international,
with extra-territorial GHG emissions having a grave impact locally.39 Moreover, the breakdown
of provincial and territorial consensus with respect to national emissions pricing illustrated the
risk of provincial non-cooperation.40 At the final stage of the analysis, the majority assessed
“whether the matter’s scale of impact is reconcilable with the division of powers”41 and
concluded that the backstop nature of the legislation meant there was very little intrusion on
provincial powers and, conversely, that the climate impacts of no federal power here were
significant, irreversible and borne by vulnerable communities.42
3.2 The Dissenting Reasons
Three judges wrote separate dissenting reasons, each of which I will address briefly.43 Justice
Côté agreed with the majority’s statement of the national concern test and she agreed that
“Parliament has the power to enact constitutionally valid legislation [establishing minimum
national standards of price stringency to reduce GHG emissions].”44 However, Côté J. would have
held the GGPPA unconstitutional in its current form because it delegated “wholly-unfettered”
regulation-making powers to the executive.45 She worried that “any substance” could be
prescribed as subject to Part 1 of the Act and that Part 2 “accords the executive vast discretion
to unilaterally set standards on an industry-by-industry basis, creating the potential for
differential treatment of industries at the executive’s whim.”46 Finally, Côté J. would have
overturned longstanding Canadian constitutional law, which permits Henry VIII clauses, to find
that such clauses are unconstitutional.47
Justice Brown dissented in full, disagreeing with the majority at every stage of the analysis. Brown
J. found that it was inappropriate to characterize the Act to include minimal national standards,
reasoning that it adds nothing and effectively decides the dispute because only Parliament can
set national standards.48 For Brown J., Part 1 and 2 of the Act each needed to be characterized
separately, each of which would have led to conclusions that the matters fall within provincial
39

ibid [173] – [176].
ibid [184] – [186].
41
ibid [160].
42
ibid [206].
43
For a longer summary and analysis of the dissents see: Nigel Banks, Andrew Leach and Martin Olszynski,
‘Supreme Court of Canada Re-writes the National Concern Test and Upholds Federal Greenhouse Gas Legislation:
Part II (The Dissents)’ (ABLawg, 29 April, 2021) [ABlawg]. <https://ablawg.ca/2021/04/29/supreme-court-ofcanada-re-writes-the-national-concern-test-and-upholds-federal-greenhouse-gas-legislation-part-ii-the-dissents/>
accessed 20 May 2021.
44
GGPPA Reference, supra note 3 [295].
45
ibid [229].
46
ibid [227], [235].
47
ibid [242] See: Paul Daly, ‘The Constitutionality of Henry VIII Clauses in Canada: Administrative Law Matter (No.
1) in the References re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2021 SCC 11’ (Administrative Law Matters, 22 April
2021) https://www.administrativelawmatters.com/blog/2021/04/22/the-constitutionality-of-henry-viii-clauses-incanada-administrative-law-matter-no-1-in-the-references-re-greenhouse-gas-pollution-pricing-act-2021-scc-11/
accessed 20 May 2021 for comment.
48
ibid [327] – [333].
40
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heads of power and thus ended the analysis.49 Curiously, Brown J. dismissed the backstop as a
defining feature of the Act under the pith and substance analysis,50 despite it featuring at every
other stage of his reasoning. Brown J. reasoned that the “Act’s entire scheme is premised on the
provinces having jurisdiction to do precisely what Parliament has presumed to do in the Act”
demonstrating that Parliament is treading on provincial jurisdiction.51 He claimed that the
majority was unfaithful to the constitution through its endorsement of a “supervisory model of
Canadian federalism.”52
Finally, Justice Rowe agreed with Brown J. in dissent, but offered his own reasons situating the
national concern test within his vision of Canadian federalism. He emphasized that POGG is a
residual power of last resort53 and he reasoned that the backstop design of the legislation is
incompatible with the national concern branch.54 Justice Rowe thought that challenges to the
regulations made under the GGPPA were inevitable, which lead him to propose a methodology
for assessing their constitutionality.55
4. Analysis
The GGPPA Reference is a significant contribution to Canadian constitutional law, Canadian
environmental law, and to the growing constellation of climate law rulings from high courts
around the world. There is much to unpack from this detailed judgment.56 In this analysis, I
identify three important shifts made by the SCC in this decision.
4.1 From Climate Denial to Climate Exceptionalism
One of the striking features of the majority’s reasons is the clarity and force with which they
describe the challenge of climate change. The judgment begins with the recognition that:
“Climate change is real. It is caused by greenhouse gas emissions resulting from human activities,
and it poses a grave threat to humanity’s future.”57 Notably, this is not merely a judicial
preamble—a nod to the social context before pivoting to the ‘black letter law.’ Instead, the

49

ibid [343] – [346].
ibid [328].
51
ibid [342].
52
ibid [455].
53
ibid [475], [501], [532], [616].
54
ibid [570] – [571].
55
ibid [600] – [615].
56
Excellent doctrinal scholarship preceded the SCC decision and more is surely forthcoming. See, e.g., Leach and
Adams, supra note; Martin Olszynski, Nigel Bankes and Andrew Leach, ’Breaking Ranks (and Precedent): Reference
re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2020 ABCA 74’ (2020), 33 Journal of Environmental Law and Practice 159;
Nathalie Chalifour, ’Jurisdictional Wrangling Over Climate Policy in the Canadian Federation: Key Issues in the
Provincial Constitutional Challenges to Parliament’s Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act’ (2019) 50 Ottawa Law
Review 197.
57
GGPPA Reference, supra note 3 [2].
50
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majority’s understanding of climate change is essential at almost every stage of the judgment.58
For instance, the majority observes that “the effects of climate do not have a direct connection
to the source of GHG emissions”59 and then goes onto find that the requirement of being single,
distinctive and indivisible is met in large part because of the extra-territorial impacts of GHG
pollution.60
The majority’s willingness to confront and address the complex phenomenon of climate change
has both symbolic and practical import. While climate denialism has never been as overt in
Canada as in the United States, currents of denialism very much inform climate politics across
the country. Just days before the SCC issued its GGPPA Reference decision, Canada’s official
opposition, the Conservative Party, rejected a motion that would recognize the reality of climate
change and its willingness to acting on it.61 To have the country’s highest court speak to the reality
of the climate change and the validity of a national response, may shift the political discourse
around climate policy.
The majority’s characterization of climate change also has practical significance, which is made
plain in contrast with Justice Brown’s dissent. Brown J. consistently downplays the extraterritorial impacts of GHG emissions.62 Instead, he focuses on provincial ability to regulate the
sources of production with little recognition of the impacts of emissions, which he says are
negligible considering the global scale of the problem.63 Indeed, Brown J. claims that it was
inappropriate for both the Attorney General and the majority to emphasize the importance of
climate change as a justification for federal authority.64
The majority’s framing of climate change as a real and existential threat and its demonstration of
how this informs legal doctrine will undoubtedly shape future climate litigation.65 Passages from
the judgment which identify specific and grave climate impacts will be advantageous to equityseeking plaintiffs who are turning to the courts for legal remedies for climate harms.66 But there
is also a potential legal trap here. The majority’s framing of climate change as “an existential
challenge” and “a threat of the highest order”67 functions analytically to narrow the majority’s
ruling. The scale and severity of the threat is such that, the majority assures, “Canada is not
58

Credit to the many intervenors who presented multiple and varied pathways for integrating climate change into
the constitutional analysis. See section 4.3 infra.
59
ibid [12].
60
ibid [187]. See also the threshold test (where the majority notes the existential threat) [171] and the scale of
impact [206] discussed in section 4.2 infra.
61
John Paul Tasker ‘Supreme Court rules Ottawa’s carbon taxis constitutional’ (Ottawa, 25 March 2021)
<https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/supreme-court-federal-carbon-tax-constitutional-case-1.5962687> accessed
19 May 2021.
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seeking to invoke the national concern doctrine too lightly.”68 It is worth recalling, however, that
climate change “is part of a family of interlocking problems… all planetary in scope and all
speaking to the fact of an overall ecological overshoot on the part of humanity.”69 Some of these
challenges, while perhaps not as salient as climate change, may well track the majority’s
reasoning in this case, supporting a stronger federal role under the POGG power.
‘Exceptionalizing’ climate change by taking up of the majority’s strong language works to legally
distinguish climate change from other pressing, transboundary environmental problems that
may well warrant a constitutionally-appropriate federal response long before the reach the
tipping point of crisis.
Indeed, climate change as “the exception” lingers in the background of this decision. The Court
appears to lay the groundwork for constitutional recognition of “the climate emergency.”70 The
POGG power also contains an emergency branch, recognizing the need for a national response
to emergencies.71 Unlike the national concern branch, the emergency branch of POGG
authorizes a federal response on a temporary basis; once the emergency has abated, federal
jurisdiction also recedes. Canada declared a climate emergency in 201972 (after the enactment
and implementation of the GGPPA) and did not argue the emergency branch in defending the
constitutionality of the GGPPA.73 However, numerous intervenors in the litigation argued that
the Act could be upheld under the emergency power. They emphasized that “[t]here can be no
dispute that climate change presents an emergency unlike any we have seen before” and that
the emergency branch doctrine should and could be sensitive to different types of
emergencies.74
As we have seen, the majority did not resort to the emergency branch of POGG, but it did adopt
the strong language of existential threat advanced by the intervenors. In addition, Brown J. in
dissent suggests that Parliament could have justified the Act as falling under this branch and,
indeed, says that relying on this doctrine would have been more consistent with Canada’s division
of powers.75 Justice Rowe is more guarded on this point, but notes that the “seriousness or
immediacy of the threat that climate change poses” would be relevant to the emergency
branch.76 While of course, this is no guarantee that future federal legislative action would be
upheld under the emergency power, the Court is clearly indicating that such arguments are
foreseeable, plausible and may well be less constitutionally fraught than the analysis in this case.
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4.2 From Not Justiciable to Justification in Climate Litigation
As in many jurisdictions around the world, Canadian courts have repeatedly ruled that climaterelated claims are not justiciable.77 As recently as 2020, the Federal Court held that the claims of
youth that the federal government’s conduct is systemically and unjustifiably violating their rights
to equality and to life, liberty and security of the person were “so political that the Courts are
incapable or unsuited to deal with them.”78 While the specific issue of justiciability was not
engaged here, the majority embraces a “culture of justification”79 in contrast to the dissents. That
is, the majority affirms that public officials must publicly justify their decisions and that the court
plays an essential role in supervising those decisions.
The first place in which the majority’s commitment to justification is evident is in its treatment
of the broad discretionary powers delegated by the GGPPA to the executive. As noted above, this
delegation is extensive, and the breadth of the delegation animated Côté J.’s partial dissent. The
majority appears unbothered by this and rejects Côté J.’s suggestion that delegated powers are
“unfettered.” Instead, the majority affirms the requirement of public justification in
administrative decision-making, echoing its watershed administrative law decision in Canada
(Minister of Immigration and Citizenship) v. Vavilov.80 The majority reasoned that the executive
must exercise its delegated powers in accordance with the purpose of the GGPPA and it would
be subject to judicial review on that basis.81 In the majority’s view, concerns about intrusive
regulations or the improper listing of a province, territory, non-GHG or industrial facility were
exaggerated.82 This is because the expectation—backed by the prospect of judicial review—is
that the executive will justify those decisions in relation to the purpose of the Act, the standards
it sets, and with scientific evidence.
The commitment to public justification is also evident in the majority’s refinement of the national
concern test, specifically the requirement to assess whether the “scale of impact on provincial
jurisdiction…is reconcilable with the fundamental distribution of legislative power under the
Constitution.”83 In the majority’s refined test, the inquiry into the scale of impact is the final check
to prevent federal overreach. While prior cases had not elaborated the details of “scale of
impact”, here the majority states:
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“at this stage of the analysis, the intrusion upon provincial autonomy that would
result from empowering Parliament to act is balanced against the extent of the
impact on the interests that would be affected if Parliament were unable to
constitutionally address the matter at a national level.”84
Curiously this analytical stage receives the least amount of attention from the majority and yet
this might be the passage with the most significant impacts for future climate litigation. It is
precisely this balancing exercise of having to assess and weigh the impacts of climate change that
courts have previously held to be beyond their institutional role. For instance, in declining to
review the exercise of delegated power under the Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act, the
Federal Court stated that the statutory text contained “policy-laden considerations [such as,
equitable distributions of emissions reductions] which are not the proper subject matter for
judicial review.”85 And yet, here, the majority directly engages with similar interests:86
“Although this restriction may interfere with a province’s preferred balance
between economic and environmental considerations, it is necessary to consider
the interests that would be harmed — owing to irreversible consequences for the
environment, for human health and safety and for the economy — if Parliament
were unable to constitutionally address the matter at a national level. This
irreversible harm would be felt across the country and would be borne
disproportionately by vulnerable communities and regions, with profound effects
on Indigenous peoples, on the Canadian Arctic and on Canada’s coastal regions. In
my view, the impact on those interests justifies the limited constitutional impact
on provincial jurisdiction.” (emphasis added)
A requirement of justification is now embedded in the national concern test, requiring a reasoned
basis for Parliament to encroach on provincial autonomy. Permissible reasons for encroachment
speak—not to Parliamentary power per se—but rather to the underlying interests of those
individuals and communities subject to the exercise of federal power. Moreover, the majority
identifies particular types of harm as salient to this analysis: irreversible harm and harms borne
disproportionately by vulnerable communities are each deserving of particular weight in the
analysis. With justification as a ubiquitous feature in public law across jurisdictions,87 this short
analysis in the GGPPA Reference may provoke further judicial engagement with specific climate
impacts.
4.3 From Constitutional Erasure to Indigenous Laws and Jurisdiction?
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The third shift in the GGPPA Reference is more tentative and spotlights a missed opportunity for
the Court to engage with Indigenous peoples as constitutional actors. Indigenous scholars
describe “climate change as intensified colonialism;” another form of settler-induced
environmental change that disrupts Indigenous relationships to land, the non-human world and
forces dislocation from traditional territories.88 The specific impacts of climate change on
Indigenous peoples in Canada were before the Court through the submissions of numerous
intervenors. For example, the Athabasca Chippewas First Nation (ACFN) submitted that
“[t]he ACFN are traditionally known as ‘caribou eaters’, or Etthen Eldeli Dené in their
language, because the livelihood and survival of their ancestors was based on
hunting woodland and barrenland caribou. …Should climate change progress, the
caribou hunting which sustained SCFN people for millennia probably will be fully
impossible.”89
The submissions of the Athabasca Chippewas First Nation underscore the existential threat of
climate change. The precarity of the caribou means that the very identity and existence of the
Athabasca Chippewas as a people are in jeopardy.
The majority was receptive to these submissions and noted at multiple junctures in its reasons
the disproportionate impacts of climate change on Indigenous peoples.90 As we saw above, these
disproportionate impacts informed the application of the national concern test. The majority’s
reasons are thus a notable departure from past environmental federalism cases which have
largely erased Indigenous peoples whose rights and title in relation to land are profoundly
affected by jurisdictional disputes between Canada and the provinces.91
At the same time, the decision presents a missed opportunity for judicial reflection on the role
of Indigenous laws and jurisdiction in Canada’s constitutional order.92 Indigenous peoples are not
only uniquely vulnerable to climate change, as the majority notes, but also stewards and
guardians of the land with obligations flowing from their own legal systems. Moreover, Canadian
constitutional law requires that the Crown fulfill distinctive legal obligations with respect to
Indigenous peoples. Intervening Indigenous Nations and organizations argued that the Court was
required to conduct a division of powers analysis that accounted for the protected rights of
Aboriginal peoples in Canada which, in this case, supported a finding of constitutionality.93 While
the outcome of the litigation is consistent with the arguments made by these interveners, the
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Court did not engage with the interpretive questions of understanding sections 91 and 92
(division of powers) in light of section 35 of the Constitution. Further, the Court did not take up
the urging of the Assembly of Manitoba Indian Chiefs to “correct the flawed narrative that
Canada is a bi-juridical country”94 and to begin to shift the paradigm for constitutional
interpretation in light of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
Darcy Lindberg is surely correct in observing that the precarious political context surrounding this
litigation made it difficult for the SCC to bridge the divide between federalism doctrine and
Aboriginal law,95 however tentative those steps may have been in this case. In other areas of
Canadian law, however, courts are actively engaging with Indigenous laws to resolve legal
problems.96 With the heightened importance of climate change for Indigenous peoples and their
leading roles in defending lands and water, Canadian federalism will soon have to make this shift.
5. Conclusion
In a climate disrupted world nothing is static, including constitutional law. This analysis observes
the movement embedded in the GGPPA Reference in response to the climate challenge. I have
argued that the majority of the Court makes three notable shifts: It abandons climate denialism
and refines legal doctrine in relation to the existential threat posed by climate change. It
embraces a culture of justification which requires the courts to play an active role in climate
adjudication, in stark contrast to past judicial findings of non-justiciability. Finally, it shifts from a
posture of Indigenous erasure to one that is sensitive to the specific impacts of Canadian
federalism on Indigenous peoples, though it leaves to future federalism litigation the task of
engaging with Indigenous peoples as constitutional actors. The GGPPA Reference is an instance
of inevitable collision between constitutional law and the onrushing reality of climate change.
We have seen that the majority has addressed this disruption in legally productive and
provocative ways. In the ever-changing world of climate litigation, the only question is which
court will make the next move.
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